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Abstract	  
Cooperation is an important behavior because it can affect all 
aspects of life (Sandholm and Crites 1996; Kagel and McGee 
2016; Cohen etal. 1999). The Prisonor’s Dilemma is a classic 
game theory game of cooperation (Falk and Fischbacher 2006). 
It shows that pure cooperation is a better strategy than pure 
non-cooperation, but that cheating when others try to cooperate 
is even better.  Here, we wanted to test the effects of age on 
cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma game. We did this by 
having individuals play two types of simple card games – one 
called Section A and the other called Section B. Section A was 
where a player played different partners in each round, while in 
Section B a player played the same partner repeatedly.  Our 
focal subjects were “college students” and “elderly people.”  
Our hypothesis is that elderly people will cooperate more than 
college students.  However, our results suggest the opposite 
occurred, with college students cooperating more than elderly 
people. 
Purpose 
The purpose of this research is to look into the effects of age on  
cooperation. We also wanted to test and see if their way of playing 
changed depending on the type of game that they were playing.  
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Ques/ons,	  Hypotheses,	  and	  Predic/ons	  
Question: The question is whether or not there are difference between 
age groups in their level of cooperation and whether they change the 
way they play games depending on the type of game.  
Hypothesis: We expect the older generation to cheat less and 
cooperate more. 
Methods	  and	  Experimental	  Design	  
    The materials that we used for our research were cards that had $0,$1,and $2 
printed on them. These were to be substitutes for real money, since the name of 
the game is the “Let’s Make Money Game”. We tested different age groups to see 
if there was a difference in how they played. The two age groups that we used 
were college students and elderly people 
   The way that we tested them was by them playing two different versions of the 
“Let’s Make Money Game”. How we went about this was that we had them play 
Section A and Section B. Section A is played by having one person play different 
people a number of times (10 times in this case). Where as Section B is played 
with two people playing each other repeatedly (10 times).  
   The object of the game is pretty simple, and it is to make the most money. The 
rules of the game however are a little more complicated.  The rules of the game 
are that when two people play a $0 card (i.e., neither cooperates) the result is no 
money for either player. When both players play the $2 card they are cooperating, 
so they get to keep their two dollars as well as take a $1 card (i.e., the reward). 
However, in the event that one person plays a $2 card and the other plays a $0 
card, the person who played $0 gets to take their opponents $2 card (i.e., the 
payoff from the temptation to cheat). The reason for this is because they cheated 
the other person out of their money, therefore the person who played $0 card gains 
that two dollars and the person who got cheated loses their money. Section A was 
the section where everyone plays different people, but still playing ten rounds with 
a different person each round. Section B was the section where each person 
picked a partner and they played 10 rounds with the same person. 
Results	  
What we found was that there was a difference between the two generations, and 
that the elderly people cheated more then the college students. Something else 
that we found was that both groups played the same in both Section A and Section 
B, so the type of game did not change their behavior.  
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Conclusions	  
We	   concluded	   from	   the	   data	   that	   the	   elderly	   people	  were	  more	  
likely	   to	  cheat	   than	   the	  college	  students.	  Many	   factors	  could	  play	  
into	  why	   the	  elderly	  were	  more	   likely	   to	  cheat.	   	  As	   for	  how	  each	  
age	  group	  played	   the	  diﬀerent	  games,	   there	  were	  no	  diﬀerences.	  	  
This	   is	   diﬀerent	   than	   previous	   research	   which	   suggest	   that	  
coopera>on	  should	  be	  more	  common	  in	  games	  where	  players	  play	  
each	  other	  repeated.	  
Future	  Direc/ons	  
	  	  	  	  In	  the	  future,	  we	  would	  like	  to	  see	  what	  results	  we	  would	  ﬁnd	  if	  
we	  studied	  the	  diﬀerences	   in	  gender.	  One	  thing	  we	  no>ced	  when	  
collec>ng	   our	   data	   was	   that	   both	   age	   groups	   were	   primarily	  
female.	  If	  we	  were	  to	  do	  this	  same	  experiment	  again,	  we	  would	  get	  
a	  variety	  of	  men	  and	  women	  and	  compare	  the	  data	  from	  the	  two	  
groups.	   It	   would	   be	   interes>ng	   to	   see	   if	   there	   was	   a	   diﬀerence	  
between	  the	  genders	  and	  see	  if	  there	  would	  be	  a	  diﬀerence	  in	  the	  
data.	  To	  add	  onto	  that,	  it	  would	  be	  interes>ng	  to	  see	  if	  there	  was	  a	  
diﬀerence	  in	  age	  associated	  with	  gender,	  with	  females	  coopera>ng	  
less	  with	  age	  and	  males	  more	  with	  age.	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The	  Prisoner’s	  Dilemma	  Game	  
Here	   is	   a	   simple	   explana>on	   of	   a	   prisoner’s	   dilemma	   game.	   	   To	  
begin	  with,	  the	  pay-­‐oﬀ	  matrix	  looks	  as	  follows,	  where	  T>R>P>S.	  
Our	   game	   follows	   this	   paYern,	   where	   both	   players	   coopera>ng	  
yields	   a	   reward	   ($1)	   that	   is	   beYer	   than	   both	   players	   not	  
coopera>ng	  ($0).	   	  However,	  the	  “tempta>on”	  to	  cheat	  is	  high,	  as	  it	  
has	  the	  highest	  payoﬀ	  ($2). 
!!!!!!!!Player'B'!!!!Cooperate!!!!!!!!!!!Don’t!Cooperate!!!!!!!!!!!Cooperate! ! !!!!
Player'A'!!!!!!!Don’t!Cooperate!
R'
Reward'
T'
Temptation'
S'
Sucker'
P'
Punishment'
!!!!!!!!!!!!!Player'B'!!!!Cooperate!!!!!!!!!!!Don’t!Cooperate!!!!!!!!!!!Cooperate
Player'A'!!!!!!!Don’t!Cooperate!
$1'
Reward'
$2'
Temptation'
7'$2'
Sucker'
$0'
Punishment'
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r=0.84,df=8,P<0.01 r=0.017,df=8,P>0.50 
Z=1.9,P=0.05 
Z=1.9,P=0.05 
